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Abstract
Fiscal policy may impose restrictions on Inflation Targeting when 
Central Bank Independence (c b i ) is institutionally weak and society has 
a real exchange rate target that is highly valued. In this environment, 
fiscal policy constrains the decisions of a committed, independent 
Central Bank (c b ) regarding inflation. When such a pressure is strong 
enough to threaten c b i , monetary authorities react by setting an infla-
tion target that differs from the one that would prevail in the absence 
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of those threats. A simple model is used to illustrate this point where 
the c b  takes into account the probability of survival as an independent 
institution.
Key words: Central bank independence, fiscal policy restrictions, 
inflation targeting.
j e l classification: E52, E58, E63.
Resumen
La política fiscal puede imponer restricciones sobre la inflación obje-
tivo, cuando la independencia del banco central es institucionalmente 
débil y la sociedad tiene una meta de tasa de cambio que es fuertemente 
valorada. En este caso, la política fiscal restringe las decisiones de 
inflación de un banco central independiente y comprometido. Cuando 
dicha presión es lo suficientemente fuerte como para amenazar la inde-
pendencia del banco, las autoridades monetarias reaccionan fijando una 
meta de inflación que difiere de aquella que prevalecería en ausencia 
de tal amenaza. Para ilustrar este punto se utiliza un modelo simple 
donde el banco central toma en cuenta la probabilidad de sobrevivir 
como una institución independiente. 
Palabras clave: independencia del banco central, restricciones de 
política fiscal, inflación objetivo.
Clasificación j e l: E52, E58, E63.
Introduction
In an open economy with fragile institutions, fiscal policy may 
influence monetary policy decisions and outcomes beyond the fiscal 
dominance channel postulated by Sargent and Wallace (1981). When 
Central Bank Independence (c b i ) faces serious and repeated threats 
from the Government, Congress or other sectors, inflation expectations 
and the incentives of the Central Bank (c b ) are affected. The private 




forming inflation expectations, while the c b  will value its survival as 
an independent institution in terms of the macroeconomic outcomes.
In such a situation, if the Central Bank perceives that too low an infla-
tion rate increases the probability of the removal of independence, it 
may choose to pursue a gradual path of disinflation1 or it may try to 
accommodate other objectives, in addition to inflation. In particular, 
since the size of Government expenditure affects the relative price of 
non-tradables goods and the magnitude of public debt may have an 
impact on sovereign spreads, the behavior of fiscal variables helps 
determine the equilibrium Real Exchange Rate (r e r ) 2. If the latter 
differs from society´s target, there will be pressure on the c b  to deliver a 
r e r  close to the target. In this case, fiscal policy may influence monetary 
policy (the c b ´s inflation targets) when “the authorities”, representing 
society, have a r e r  target that is highly valued.
For instance, a permanent rise in public expenditure (usually biased 
toward non-tradable sectors) may drive the equilibrium r e r  below 
the authorities’ r e r  target. Then, there will be pressure on the c b  to 
deliver a r e r  closer to the target, probably by producing an ‘inflation 
surprise’. If this pressure turns into serious threats to its independence, 
even a committed c b  may set inflation targets above the rates that 
would prevail in the absence of these threats. In doing so, the c b  tries 
to increase its probability of survival as an independent institution to 
deliver an inflation rate below the discretionary level.
Furthermore, if fiscal policy is not flexible and cannot be used to 
compensate external shocks (e.g. to terms of trade or international 
interest rates), the c b ´s inflation targets will be affected by those shocks 
and the threats to its independence. In a disinflation process, this means 
that the c b  may be too timid in fighting inflation in the presence of 
shocks that appreciate the currency in real terms. In addition, when 
public debt is very high and there are doubts about the Government’s 
ability to repay it, a successful fiscal adjustment program will probably 
1  See for example Cukierman (2000).




, where p* is the foreign price level, p is the domestic 
price level and e is the nominal exchange rate.174
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generate a reduction in the sovereign debt spreads and a real apprecia-
tion. This may also induce a relaxation in the disinflation process. 
These ideas are modelled in this paper following the Barro and Gordon 
(1983) and Cukierman (1992) frameworks, by introducing a third 
stage in their sequential policy game. In this new stage an attempt is 
made to remove c b i . Since overriding the independent c b  requires a 
qualified majority and the support of the public, it is assumed that the 
probability of an attempt to remove c b i  (or the probability of success 
in such an attempt) is a function of the distance between the authori-
ties’ r e r  target and the r e r  implied by the c b ’s inflation target. The 
larger the difference, the broader the support to reform the c b . With 
this feature, the independent c b can influence its probability of survival 
through its choice of the inflation target and, therefore, ends up trying 
to accommodate other objectives at the cost of higher inflation. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first part a discussion 
regarding disinflation, c b i  and threats to the latter is given to motivate 
our hypothesis. Then, the model used to illustrate the previous ideas 
is presented. 
I.  Disinflation and threats to central bank independence 
During the last twenty years many countries around the world have 
been successful in controlling inflation either by shock or gradual 
stabilizations. The former have been used by high inflation countries 
whereas gradual disinflations have been implemented by countries 
with a lower level of inflation. Additionally, the participation of the 
government in the disinflation process has been greater when inflation 
is high rather than when it is low. For example, in Chile this process 
was gradual and was mainly done by the c b  while Argentina, Bolivia 
and Israel applied the shock stabilization with a high intervention of 
the government (Cukierman, 2006). In Colombia the independent c b  
started a process of inflation reduction in 1991 that has taken more 
than a decade and has implied a slow pace of disinflation3. 
3  The speed of disinflation during 1991-1998, the period of two-digit inflation in Colombia, 
was around 2% and from 1999 to 2006, when the inflation reached one digit, it was on 
average 0.7%. The experience of other countries has shown that the speed of disinflation 




Different explanations have been given to the varying speed of disinfla-
tion processes. One of them is related to the strategy adopted by central 
banks for achieving price stability. In this framework, disinflation can 
be reached by adopting a deliberate path towards a low inflation level 
or by using an opportunistic strategy (Bomfim and Rudebush, 1997). 
The latter implies that a central bank does not take any action to reduce 
inflation but waits for external favourable shocks (e.g. supply shocks 
or unforeseen recessions) to reduce inflation (Orphanides and Wilcox, 
2002). This opportunistic approach implies a gradual path of disinfla-
tion, but with a high cost in terms of the central bank’s credibility. 
Another explanation is given by Collard et al. (2007) who develop 
a New Keynesian model in which gradual disinflation emerges as a 
result of deep habits and countercyclical mark-ups. Deep habits imply 
that the price elasticity of demand in all good markets decreases in the 
face of a recession and, as a result, firms increase mark-ups. In this 
context, a central bank that reduces its inflation target and follows a 
Taylor Rule will produce a gradual, hump-shaped response of both 
inflation and the nominal interest rate. 
A low level of credibility of the c b  may imply a high cost of disin-
flation in terms of unemployment (a high sacrifice ratio) and, thus, 
may also explain the “low” speed of disinflation pursued by some 
central banks. This lack of credibility may in turn be related to the 
effect of time inconsistency and discretionary monetary policy on 
inflation expectations and the formation of nominal wages and prices. 
A solution to this problem consists of removing all discretionary 
power from the government and delegating monetary policy to an 
independent and conservative central banker who takes into account 
the social preferences regarding the target of inflation and output, but 
places a higher weight on the inflation target than the government 
does (Rogoff, 1985)4.
However, the empirical literature has found a negative relationship 
between c b i  and the speed of disinflation (Jordan, 1999), as well as 
a positive link between c b i  and the sacrifice ratio (Fischer, 1995; 
4  A second proposal is based on the principal-agent approach, and looks for a performance 
contract between the government (the principal) and the central bank (the agent) that pro-
vides the latter with the incentives to optimize the social welfare function (Walsh, 1995). 176
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Fischer, 1996). Nevertheless, these results depend on models that 
assume exogenous persistence of inflation. When the latter is explained 
by the degree of c b i , lower inflation persistence and a higher speed 
of disinflation are associated to a high level of c b i  (Diana and Sidiro-
poulos, 2004)5. 
A different strand of the literature argues that c b i  may not be sufficient 
to produce a rapid disinflation when the lack of consensus in society 
about the benefits of low levels of inflation weakens the institution 
of an independent c b  and make it more vulnerable to threats coming 
from many sectors. Therefore, a central bank conducting a policy that 
lacks broad political and public support6 exhibits an independence 
level lower than the legal7 one and can sooner or later be overridden8. 
Lohmann (1992) shows that if the authorities retain the option to 
override the central banker’s decisions in the presence of large shocks 
to output, the central banker accommodates the policymaker’s objec-
tives in order to avoid being overridden. 
This paper falls under this approach and considers an independent 
central bank in a fragile institutional framework, where threats to c b i  
may be realized. In this context, the central bank partially accom-
modates objectives other than inflation in order to survive as an 
independent entity. More precisely, threats to c b i  emerge when the 
authorities have a real exchange rate (r e r ) target that is more depre-
ciated than the r e r  implied by the c b ’s inflation target. In this case, 
5  Furthermore, even if c b i  and the sacrifice ratio were directly related, Cukierman (2002) 
shows that c b i  is welfare enhancing because of the positive long term benefits derived from 
stable prices and the short run gains from temporary monetary expansions.
6  When inflation is sufficiently sustained, society becomes accustomed to it, reducing op-
position to inflation and eroding actual c b i  (Cukierman, 1992).
7  Measures of actual independence of the central bank show a level of independence that is 
different from the legal one because of the existence of informal arrangements that do not 
follow the c b  law. Although most empirical research is related to the measurement of legal 
c b i  (see Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991 and Eijffinger and Schaling, 1992), other 
studies have tried to develop some measures of actual independence and have developed 
indicators of political vulnerability (see Cukierman, 1992, Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, 
1992 and Cukierman and Webb, 1995).
8  In addition to the lack of public opposition to inflation, other reasons to override c b i  are the 
lack of democratic accountability and the potential break of coordination between monetary 




external pressures on the c b  may be exerted to deliver a higher depre-
ciation. In such a situation, the response of a committed, independent 
c b  is to select an inflation rate above the level that would have been 
chosen in the absence of threats to its independence. 
This implies that disinflation will be gradual in periods of real apprecia-
tion of the currency. For example, a gradual disinflation process was 
observed in Colombia during 1991-1997, when the currency appreci-
ated in real terms. Table 1 shows that such a disinflation was slower 
than episodes of disinflation in other Latin American economies that 
did not have hard pegs and exhibited a real appreciation of their curren-
cies9. At the same time, threats to c b i  were issued on several occasions 
during that period in Colombia (Vargas and Betancourt, 2010)10. 
Finally, another implication of our model is that fiscal policy may 
influence c b  behaviour through its effect on the equilibrium r e r, given 
the possibility of threats to c b i  and in the presence of a depreciated 
r e r  target that is highly valued by society. 





Number of years 6 7 6
Change in annual inflation -9.1% -21.3% -47.6%
Average change per year -1.5% -3.0% -9.5%
Change in r e r -18.41% -33.16% -34.81%
Average change per year -3.07% -4.74% -6.96%
Period’s growth rate 4.03% 7.66% 2.97%
% Points of disinflation per each 
% Point of appreciation
0.50% 0.64% 1.37%
Source: Authors’ calculations.
9  For each point of annual real appreciation, Colombian disinflation (1991-1997) was lower 
than in Chile (1990-1997) and Mexico (1995-2001). However, in the case of Mexico, a lower 
growth rate (and probably a negative output gap) may help explain part of the difference.
10  Real and serious threats to c b i  from the government or Congress have been documented 
for different countries, even for the most autonomous central banks like the Bundesbank 
(Siklos and Bohl, 2005).178
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II. The model
A.   Framework 
A simple model is posited here to find the equilibrium in a sequential 
game in which an independent c b  committed with an inflation target 
is threatened to be removed if its policy does not support the society’s 
r e r objective. This objective is reflected in the authorities’ preferences. 
By “authorities” we mean the Government, Congress or an institu-
tion with the possibility of removing c b i . The key assumption of the 
model is that the attempt to remove c b i  has a probability of success 
that depends on the difference between the society’s r e r  target and 
the r e r  implied by the announced inflation target.
In this sequential game an independent c b  announces an inflation 
target, then the private sector forms its inflation expectation and, at 
a third stage, “the authorities” make an attempt at removing c b i  to 
achieve a more depreciated r e r , closer to their target. The structure of 
the game is similar to the one considered in Barro and Gordon (1983) 
and Cukierman (1992). The difference is the introduction of the third 
stage in which an attempt is made to remove c b i . With this feature, 
the independent c b can influence its probability of survival through its 
choice of the inflation target and, therefore, ends up trying to accom-
modate other objectives at the cost of higher inflation. 
Since overriding the independent c b  requires a qualified majority and 
the support of the public, it is assumed that the probability of an attempt 
to remove c b i  (or the probability of success in such an attempt) is a 
function of the distance between the authorities’ r e r  target and the 
implied r e r  by the c b ’s inflation target. The larger the difference, the 
broader the support to reform the c b, since, for example, exporters and 
tradeable goods producers would strongly lobby to avoid an ex-ante 
appreciated r e r . Thus, it is assumed that these pressure groups suffer 
from the dynamic inconsistency problem that explains the existence 
of an independent c b  in the first place.
The private sector is assumed to have rational expectations. Therefore, 
it takes into account the probability of independent c b  survival when 
forming its inflation expectations. The committed c b  in turn incorpo-




office and the reaction function of the private sector (its expectations). 
Finally, it is assumed that “the authorities” are unable to commit to a 
target and are thus subjected to an inflation bias. 
The result is that, in equilibrium, a committed, independent c b  selects 
an inflation rate above the level chosen in the absence of threats to its 
independence. Intuitively, the c b  tries to “survive” with the purpose 
of delivering an outcome that is better than pure discretion and, in 
order to increase its probability of “survival”, the c b  accepts higher 
levels of inflation. This means that a threatened, committed c b  will 
disinflate slowly when the equilibrium r e r is below the r e r target, and 
especially, when the equilibrium r e r  appreciates starting from a point 
below the r e r  target. This behavior could help explain why disinfla-
tion was slow in Colombia when there were fundamental reasons for a 
real appreciation of the currency. It can also explain how fiscal policy 
influences inflation targeting through its impact on the r e r  and the 
“political economy” channel described above11.
B.   Assumptions
In addition to the setting described above, the following are the main 
assumptions of the model. Nominal wages are set at the beginning of 
a one-period contract according to the expected price level. Hence, 
exporters or other tradable goods producers derive benefits from local 
currency prices above the expected level. These benefits, in turn, are 
highly valued by society. This may reflect a strong lobby by powerful 
tradable goods producers on the basis of employment increases in 
those sectors.
The game has four stages, which are represented in the figure 1.
11  This game is similar to the one considered in Cukierman (1992), Ch. 5, in which a relation-
ship between fiscal variables and inflation appears through the strategic interaction between 
labor unions and a c b  that is subject to an inflation bias for “mercantilist” motives.180
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Figure 1.  Timing of the game.
0 1 2 3
c b  announces 
inflation target
Public forms inflation 
expectations and no-
minal wages are set.
“Authorities” try 
to remove c b i  with 
probability of success 
(1 – p)
Decision by c b  
on inflation: 
- If independent delivers 
inflation target.
- If not, delivers discretio-
nary level of inflation.
Source: Elaboration of the authors.
The c b  and “the authorities” have the same preferences in terms of 
inflation and the r e r . They dislike an inflation rate different from an 
optimal level, assumed to be zero, and a r e r  that is more appreciated 
than society’s r e r  target. Thus, both the c b  and “the authorities” want 
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Where qT is the “society’s” r e r target, e is the nominal exchange rate, px 
is the external price index, pe is the expected domestic price level and 
A is a parameter denoting the weight of the r e r  target in the objective 
function12. The function (.) is specified as follows:
 . ()=
−− +> +− qe pp qe pp
Tx eT xe       if    




Hence, it is assumed that the c b and “the Authorities” care about devia-
tions from the r e r  target only when it lies above (is more depreciated 
than) the expected r e r 13. For simplicity and given the motivation of the 
paper, attention will be restricted only to this case and px will be assumed 
to be zero. So, the objective cost function can be expressed as:
Aq qe





12  All variables are expressed in logarithms.
13  This asymmetric cost function is similar to the one posited by Cukierman (1992), page 




Furthermore, it is assumed that the nominal exchange rate floats, so 
nominal depreciation is jointly determined by an exogenous, funda-
mental-driven, equilibrium r e r , q*, and inflation (chosen by the c b ). 
Thus   eqq =− () + −
*
1 , where q–1 is the previous level of the r e r 14. 
The policymaker’s cost objective becomes:
Aq q





Recall that attention is restricted to the case in which the r e r  target 
is more depreciated than the expected r e r  and, in particular, it is 
assumed that the r e r  target is more depreciated than the equilibrium 
r e r , (qT - q*) > 0.
Notice that the c b  and the authorities share the same objective function. 
The difference between them lies on their ability to commit to an 
inflation target. While the independent c b  can commit, the authorities 
would deliver a higher discretionary inflation level because they would 
try to obtain a more depreciated currency by surprising agents.
The timing of the game is as follows:
•  At stage 3, “the authorities” or a c b  that is not able to commit to 
an inflation target, will choose the discretional level of inflation 
 = A to minimize this cost, given inflation expectations. 
•  At stage 2, “the authorities” want the discretionary solution  = A, 
regardless of the inflation target, and would like to remove the inde-
pendent, committed c b  if the inflation target differs from A. The pro-
bability of an attempt to do so (or of a successful attempt) is (1 – p), 
where  pp qq
ae T =+ − () − ()
*   is the probability of survival of 
the independent c b  and a is the inflation target previously chosen 
14  Notice that it is assumed that nominal depreciation incorporates the effect of monetary 
policy (through inflation), changes in the equilibrium r e r  and the correction of possible 
past deviations from equilibrium r e r :   eqqq q =− () +− () + −− −
** *
11 1 .182
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  by the c b . This probability depends on the distance between the 
expected r e r ,  q
ae * +− ()  , and the target r e r , qT, and is assumed 
to have the following properties:
pq q
ae T '
* >+ − () < 0            if    
                       

     p'' ≤ 0
  It means that in the relevant range of analysis, the probability of 
survival of the independent c b  increases with the expected r e r .
  If the attempt to eliminate c b i  occurs and is successful, the dis-
cretionary solution is obtained,  = A. If not, the independent c b  
stays and delivers  = a, where A > a. Thus, at stage 1 the private 
sector calculates the expected inflation as follows:

ea pp A = () +−() () .. 1
•  At stage 0, the committed, independent c b  solves its decision 
problem and announces the inflation target πa, taking into account 
the reaction function of the private sector,   
ee a p = () , , and the 
probability of keeping its independence,  pp qq
ae T =+ − () − ()
*  . 
C.  Equilibrium
In the absence of threats to c b i , the committed c b  announces an inflation 
target, πa , and delivers the optimal inflation under the rule   = a = 0 
(Barro and Gordon, 1983). Then the public will fully believe this 
target, and both inflation and the inflation surprise will be set to zero 
(the efficient outcome). 
Under threats to c b i , however, the committed c b  is uncertain about 
whether an attempt to remove its independence will be made or 
whether it will be successful. Hence, the risk neutral c b  chooses the 
inflation target in order to minimize the expected value of its objective 
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Which implies that the c b  will choose the inflation target, a, such that 
the Net Marginal Cost (henceforth n m c ) of inflation, taking into account 
the effect on the probability of survival, will be zero. In this case, the 
independent c b  faces a trade off between the cost of an inefficiently 
high inflation rate and the benefit of a higher probability of survival. 
D.   Results








15, as the intuition would suggest, and given the assump-
tions made about the probability function p(.), the following results 
are obtained:
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Result 1: In the presence of threats to c b i , the optimal inflation target 
for the independent c b , a, is greater than zero. Suppose a  = 0, then 







0. Therefore, it 
pays for the c b  to increase inflation provided that the second order 
condition is met16.
Result 2: The optimal inflation for the independent c b , a , is less than A. 
Suppose a  = A, then the n m c  of inflation becomes positive if p(q* – qT) 
is greater than zero17. This means that the marginal net benefit from 
increasing inflation at a  = A is negative. Therefore, it pays to decrease 
inflation, provided that the second order condition is met.
Summing up, when the target r e r  is more depreciated than the equili-
brium r e r , q* < qT, the committed c b  will announce an inflation target 
that is above the equilibrium level in the absence of threats to its inde-
pendence, but that is still below the discretionary level of inflation: 
0 < a  < A. Intuitively, when the c b  is threatened and it can influence 
its probability of survival, there are additional marginal benefits from 
inflation (higher probability of survival) and, as a result, equilibrium 
inflation is also higher. 
In addition to these results, equation (1) may be used to find the effect 




















Equation (2) represents the change in the n m c  of inflation that follows a 
change in the equilibrium r e r . It can be verified that if the probability of 






  0 , as 
the intuition would suggest, and under the assumptions made so far, 







2  and  .
17  This is reasonable to have  pq q










  0 . See 
the Appendix for a proof. Therefore:
Result 3: An appreciation of the equilibrium r e r  reduces the n m c  of 
inflation and increases the equilibrium inflation target. Intuitively, this 
happens because a more appreciated equilibrium r e r  reduces the proba-
bility of survival of the independent c b . Hence, a rise in the inflation 
target increases inflation expectations by less than before, as the proba-
bility of survival is lower. Thus, the benefit of the “inflation surprise”, 
a – e, in terms of reaching a higher r e r  is greater than before, and so 
is the marginal benefit of inflation18. In practice, this result means that 
a threatened, committed c b will disinflate slowly when the equilibrium 
r e r  is below the r e r  target, and especially, when the equilibrium r e r  
appreciates starting from a point below the r e r  target. 
The implications of this conclusion in terms of the effect of fiscal policy 
on inflation targeting in this context can be made clear now.
Result 4: A permanent increase in government expenditure that is 
biased toward non-tradeable goods will appreciate the equilibrium 
r e r . In these circumstances, disinflation will be slower.
Result 5: If government expenditure is inflexible and cannot offset a 
real appreciation driven by fundamental external factors, disinflation 
will be slower. 
Result 6: If initially the equilibrium r e r  is high because vulne-
rable public finances generate high sovereign spreads, a successful 
adjustment program will produce a real appreciation. If the initial 
equilibrium r e r  is below or equal to the r e r  target, disinflation will 
be slower. 
18  The assumption p"(.) ≤ 0 also helps explain this result. Intuitively, a rise in r e r  reduces the 
response of the probability of survival to higher inflation targets.186
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IV.  Conclusions
When Central Bank Independence (c b i ) faces serious and repeated 
threats from the Government, Congress or other sectors, inflation 
expectations and the incentives of the Central Bank (c b ) are affected. 
In such a situation, if the c b  perceives that too low an inflation rate 
increases the probability of the removal of its independence, it may 
choose to pursue a gradual path of disinflation or it may try to accom-
modate other objectives, in addition to inflation.
Pressures on the c b  may be exerted when society has a real exchange 
rate (r e r ) target more depreciated than the r e r  implied by the c b ’s 
inflation target. In this case, the response of a committed, independent 
c b  is to select an inflation rate above the level chosen in the absence of 
threats to its independence. Thus, when fiscal policy induces an equi-
librium real appreciation, or when it is so inflexible that cannot be used 
to offset the impact of external shocks on the r e r, a link between fiscal 
policy and inflation targeting appears through the effects of threats to 
c b i  on inflation expectations and the c b ’s decision process. 
This behavior helps explain why disinflation could be slow when there 
are fundamental reasons for a real appreciation of the currency. It can 
also explain how fiscal policy influences inflation targeting through 
its impact on the r e r  and the “political economy” channel beyond the 
fiscal dominance channel postulated by Sargent and Wallace (1981). 
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Response of the probability of survival to the inflation target
Given inflation expectations  
ea pp A =+ − () 1 , the probability 
function becomes  pp qq pA
Ta =− +− () − () ()
* 1   and the response of 
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We will assume that  dp
dq
* > 0because it is intuitively consistent with the 
basic assumptions (the closer the r e r  is to the r e r  target, the higher 190
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the probability of independent c b  survival, for r e r  levels below the 
r e r target). From  pp qq pA
Ta =− +− () − () ()
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> 0, both of which are assumptions previously made. This 
completes the proof.
 
19  The latter is the same as the assumption made to show that  dp
d
a 
> 0.